Three weeks into the six-week Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement, the situation is growing dicy. The agreement, which once looked like a promising beginning to a long-term pause in the war, now seems like it may simply prove a temporary lull. Worse, it seems possible that, thanks to Hamas, the ceasefire may not even survive its intended six weeks.

After President Trump’s recent statement expressing interest in taking control of the Gaza Strip, Hamas has few good options. The organization, which has a history of prioritizing public opinion over conventional military success, is likely to prefer a conflict with Israel to mass exodus of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip and a loss of geopolitical relevance.

If Hamas believes President Trump is serious about taking control over the Gaza Strip, the most rational position for the organization is to continue the war. That leaves the organization with a conundrum, however: if Hamas violates the ceasefire first, it may well lead to the U.S. directly intervening in the conflict. The pressures being exerted on Hamas, then, seem destined to drive it to do exactly what it appears to be doing: manipulating Israel into violating the ceasefire.

The Ceasefire

As a reminder, the crux of the ceasefire deal is a hostage exchange: for each of the thirty-three hostages Hamas will release as part of the agreement, Israel will release either thirty or fifty Palestinian prisoners, depending on the hostage being released. As part of the ceasefire agreement, Israel has withdrawn from much of the Gaza Strip, allowing Hamas to reassert control over much of the Strip.

The terms of the deal appear, at first blush, broadly advantageous to Hamas. Yet the cease-fire agreement also allows Israel to save face. Israel stated two major military objectives in prosecuting its war against Hamas: to recover the hostages and to dismantle the quasi-governmental terrorist organization. On the first front, Israel has broadly failed. Although the I.D.F. successfully recovered a handful of hostages, high profile failures, including the accidental killing of escaped hostages by I.D.F. soldiers have proven the difficulty of accomplishing this objective through direct military force. The safest and most effective way to recover hostages is through negotiation.

On the second front, however, Israel set itself an impossible task. Completely destroying Hamas was never a serious possibility, given its nature as a multi-national organization. What Israel accomplished instead – killing, by U.S. estimates, more than 10,000 enemy combatants, including October 7th mastermind Yahya Sinwar – was likely as close to achieving this goal as it could come. Continuing to prosecute the war in the Gaza Strip serves little purpose other than furthering Israel’s international isolation.

Despite a nominally favorable ceasefire deal, Hamas seems dissatisfied with letting sleeping dogs lie. The organization has released its hostages in humiliating and unacceptable ways. Some hostages were dressed up in military fatigues, some forced to march through an angry crowd, others were forced to deliver speeches at gunpoint directly before their release. These actions don’t just demean the hostages; they endanger the ceasefire agreement itself. By turning hostage releases into spectacles, Hamas is vindicating the Israeli far-right, which opposed a ceasefire deal in the first place. If Prime Minister Netanyahu chooses to use military force to punish Hamas, he will violate the terms of the ceasefire. If he simply allows them to continue as they are doing, his already struggling far-right coalition in the Knesset may collapse.

Ultimately, Hamas’ hostage releases seem calculated to exert exactly the sort of domestic political pressure on Israeli leaders that could lead to them violating the ceasefire agreement. And while Hamas was already dramatizing hostage releases, it seems likely that the organization will double down on that strategy in the wake of President Trump’s announcement.

Should Israel actually violate the ceasefire agreement, the results would be catastrophic for it. It is a distinct possibility that Israel violating a ceasefire agreement would result in both economic sanctions and political censure. South Africa’s case against Israel in the International Court of Justice would be strengthened, as would the International Criminal Court case against Mr. Netanyahu.

In traditional military terms, the results of Israel violating the ceasefire agreement could be catastrophic for Hamas, as well. But Hamas is not fighting a war with conventional military measures of success. Hamas is trying to win the war for public opinion, and, unfortunately for Israel, Hamas seems to be winning. If Israel breaches a ceasefire agreement, regardless of the domestic pressure its leaders may be experiencing, everyday international observers will likely miss that essential context. Instead, they will likely perceive Israel’s actions as yet another instance of misconduct. And then they’ll go vote for politicians who are unfriendly towards Israel.

Where We Are Now

It’s impossible to know for certain whether I am correct about Hamas’ aims. There is no question that Israel and Hamas hold deep animosity for, and low opinions of, one another, however. In this light, I struggle to see how Hamas could not imagine that its management of hostage releases is endangering the ceasefire. Particularly after well-documented Israeli complaints on the subject.

I want to believe that the ceasefire will last beyond the first six weeks. But President Trump’s declaration of interest in acquiring Gaza threatens Hamas’ territorial sovereignty and geopolitical relevance. Hamas has opposed Palestinian exodus from the Gaza Strip throughout the war. If Hamas is a rational actor, it will almost certainly prefer an endless, meaningless, brutal war to a peace without a Palestine.

Baiting Israel may not even be particularly difficult: the Israeli far-right would be more than happy to continue the war in Gaza. After all, there is a nearly two decade precedent for Hamas and the Israeli far-right to tacitly collaborate. The Israeli and the Palestinian far-right may hate each other, but they can agree on one thing: there should only be one state between the river and the sea.